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“THEY WERE PLAYING CHICKEN”
The U.S. Asiatic Fleet’s Gray-Zone Deterrence Campaign  
against Japan, 1937–40
Hunter Stires
 The United States is facing a significant strategic challenge to its interests, al-lies, and leadership of the liberal world order from an increasingly wealthy, 
well-armed, and assertively nationalistic China� Whether through the seizure of 
maritime features and the construction of artificial island fortifications in the 
South China Sea, the aggressive use of maritime law enforcement to articulate 
and impose its nationalistic territorial claims on its neighbors, or attempts to re-
strict military and civilian freedom of navigation in international waters, Chinese 
forces are working to undermine and revise the political and geopolitical status 
quo in East Asia�1 These subtly assertive steps, which stop short of open warfare, 
constitute a category of activity known to contemporary military thinkers as 
gray-zone aggression�2 Current U�S� policy makers and the forces at their com-
mand struggle to find effective countermeasures 
against this strategy, which operates by incre-
mental “salami-slice” actions that individually fall 
below the thresholds that normally would justify 
a military response but cumulatively achieve the 
political-strategic revision to the status quo that 
conventional deterrence aims to prevent�3
However, this is not the first time the United 
States has faced such a destabilizing challenge in 
the western Pacific� Starting in 1937, Japanese 
forces invading metropolitan China undertook 
a concerted campaign to expel U�S�, British, and 
other Western interests from that country as part 
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of imperial Japan’s broader effort to dominate East Asia and actualize the popu-
lar jingoistic slogan of “Asia for the Asiatics�”4 Japanese moves against the West 
during this period bear striking resemblance to those of China today, including 
blockades of key foreign outposts, attempts to infringe on free navigation in rec-
ognized international waterways, and the harassment (and at times open attack) 
of foreign warships�5
Against this Japanese gray-zone campaign stood the U�S� Navy’s small but 
highly experienced forward-deployed contingent in the western Pacific, the U�S� 
Asiatic Fleet, with its thirty-nine warships and five thousand “old China hands” 
under the command of longtime Asia specialist Admiral Harry E� Yarnell, USN� 
With a combination of individual initiative and delegated authority from Wash-
ington, Yarnell adopted a policy that U�S� naval forces would protect American 
citizens in China wherever they were in danger for as long as necessary and as-
sume a forward-leaning force posture of deterrence through persistent presence 
and engagement� During the period of its implementation between 1937 and 
1940, Yarnell’s assertive and dynamic approach was markedly successful at pro-
tecting American nationals and comprehensively deterring Japanese encroach-
ments against American interests� Eighty years on, the dynamics of imperial 
Japan’s gray-zone aggression against the United States and its Western partners 
during the invasion of China and the U�S� Asiatic Fleet’s experience in countering 
these efforts offer an important, yet thus far little-known, case study for contem-
porary American policy makers and commanders seeking to contextualize and 
find solutions to twenty-first-century gray-zone challenges�
CHINA AS CHESSBOARD
An examination of the operating environment in 1930s China provides impor-
tant points of comparison to circumstances prevailing now� Although that era 
is remembered (not least by today’s ruling Chinese Communist Party) for the 
colonized-colonizer relationship between a largely prostrate China and the for-
eign powers that had dominated it since the nineteenth century, China in its weak-
ness was also very much a playing field among the imperial powers themselves�
Position of the Foreign Powers in China
With the virtual elimination of German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian impe-
rial influence from China following the First World War and the Bolshevik Revo-
lution, the chief foreign powers in China in the 1930s were Japan, Great Britain, 
the United States, and France� Each of these countries had significant economic 
interests in China and maintained forward-deployed military and naval forces for 
their protection� As Yarnell reported in a January 1938 letter to U�S� High Com-
missioner for the Philippines Paul V� McNutt, before the start of Sino-Japanese 
hostilities in the July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan had the largest 
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foreign presence, with one hundred thousand nationals living in China and three 
hundred million yen (roughly U�S�$89 million) in trade with China in 1934�6 By 
Yarnell’s assessment, Great Britain was next in importance, with fifteen thousand 
nationals in-country, one thousand business firms, and one billion dollars in 
investment� After Japan and Britain came the United States, with ten to eleven 
thousand citizens and $230 million in investment, including the property of two 
to three thousand missionaries� France was a distant fourth, with three thousand 
citizens and two hundred firms� Germany and Italy also were present, but to a 
lesser degree�7
By 1937, the foreign powers maintained two general international settlements 
in China, one at Shanghai on the south shore of the Whangpoo River and one 
at Amoy on the island of Kulangsu, as well as a number of national concessions, 
particularly the British and the French at Canton and the British, French, and 
Italians at Tientsin�8 According to Kurt Bloch, writing for the Institute of Pacific 
Relations’ Far Eastern Survey in May 1939, “the bulk of China’s foreign trade is 
handled by foreign and Chinese merchants resident in concessions and settle-
ments� Indeed, for eighty years prior to the outbreak of the present conflict, no 
less than 50% of China’s foreign trade passed through Shanghai alone�”9
Rights of Foreign Powers in China Enshrined by Treaty—Relevant Analogue to 
Today’s International Legal Landscape
In its capacity as a chessboard, China held a unique legal status as an imperial—if 
not quite global—commons that contributes to its usefulness as an analogue to 
the present� In that era, the process of formal codification of global international 
law had progressed primarily to issues of nationality and armed conflict rather 
than the more expansive system today that seeks to regulate state conduct across 
a far wider spectrum of activities�10
However, international law was codified more extensively inside China than it 
was outside, with imperial activity in China regulated through a series of treaties 
between China and the great powers that expressly delineated foreign rights and 
privileges there� This patchwork body of accumulated bilateral and multilateral 
jurisprudence operated on a general international basis in accordance with the 
accepted principle of equal opportunity and equal treatment of foreign powers 
and citizens engaged in commerce in China� This had key implications for ques-
tions of freedom of navigation and maritime law in particular�11 Unlike on the 
broader oceans, which remained subject only to customary international law 
until the postwar United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, on Chinese 
waterways international freedom of navigation was enshrined specifically as far 
back as the Tientsin Treaties of 1858–59�12 International settlements and conces-
sions were given similar legal recognition�13 Accordingly, Japanese gray-zone ag-
gression and attempts at coercion took place against a backdrop of the defenders’ 
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explicit legal rights—as Chinese gray-zone aggression and coercion in the South 
and East China Seas typically do today�
The U.S. Asiatic Fleet in 1937: Strategic Predicament of Western  
Forward-Deployed Naval Forces
During the interwar period, the Asiatic Fleet was the latest incarnation of the U�S� 
Navy’s forward-deployed force in the western Pacific, maintained continuously 
since 1835 except for a brief interruption during the American Civil War�14 In 
1937, the Asiatic Fleet was composed of thirty-nine ships: two cruisers, thirteen 
aging destroyers, six small submarines, three oceangoing gunboats, seven river 
gunboats, three minesweepers, two tankers, two tenders, and one armed yacht�15 
Although its nominal area of responsibility stretched from the Persian Gulf to the 
international date line, its limited resources meant that the Asiatic Fleet’s chief 
purpose was of a diplomatic and constabulary nature—specifically, safeguarding 
American interests in East Asia�16 “Interests” were taken to mean lives, property, 
commerce, diplomatic outposts, treaty rights, and, after 1898, colonial posses-
sions in the Philippines, which the U�S� Asiatic Squadron under Commodore 
George Dewey first acquired in the opening action of the Spanish-American War� 
The Asiatic Fleet’s focal point was unquestionably China, given the significant 
American economic and diplomatic interests and foreign imperial activity there�
Despite its small size, after 1919 the Asiatic Fleet’s commander was always a 
four-star admiral, one of just four in the U�S� Navy at the time� This practice was 
meant to ensure that the senior American naval representative in China would 
not be outranked by his European and Japanese naval and military counterparts 
in the vital diplomatic exchanges that were at the center of the Asiatic Fleet’s 
role�17
Western forward-deployed naval forces, specifically the U�S� Asiatic Fleet, the 
Royal Navy’s China Station, and the French navy’s Far East Squadron, faced a 
strategic situation that starkly resembles the one faced by the Japan-based ele-
ments of the U�S� Seventh Fleet today� Each of these formations were and are rela-
tively small contingents of large but distant navies, facing down the concentrated 
forces of an increasingly avaricious, regionally based peer competitor whose 
heavy battle squadrons would take only hours to sortie from their home bases to 
the locations of the interests at stake, as opposed to the weeks of steaming time 
that separated—and continues to separate—the China seas from major Western 
fleet concentration areas on the U�S� West Coast and in the Mediterranean� As a 
result, the Western fleet commanders were faced with the challenge of safeguard-
ing their nations’ interests and international treaty law from an unescapable 
position of local material disadvantage and military inferiority in the event of a 
hostile contingency�
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Militant Ultranationalism and Lack of Civilian Oversight as  
Sources of Factional Complexity, Unaccountability, and Danger
Over the course of the interwar period, Japan was riven by political turmoil and 
spates of assassinations fomented and conducted by nationalist and pan-Asianist 
officers in the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy (IJA and IJN, respectively)� 
This was followed in 1931 by the IJA’s abandonment of any remaining pretense 
of subservience to civilian authority when it seized Manchuria from China on 
its own initiative—and, according to Yarnell, “without the knowledge or consent 
of the Premier or responsible civil officials in Tokyo�”18 In the interim between 
the takeover of Manchuria and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the IJA and IJN 
secured near-complete domination over the political scene at home, with the IJA 
the more powerful of the two rival services� The civilian government, although 
nominally still in charge, was essentially powerless and largely blind to the ac-
tions being taken in its name� This had significant implications for American 
diplomacy, as Yarnell observed in July 1939:
During the present controversy, the rights of Americans in the Far East have been 
upheld vigorously by the State Department� Had our notes been addressed to a 
government which retained control over its armed forces, some recognition of our 
rights might have been obtained� � � � It should be recognized however that the Tokyo 
government is generally impotent to deal with or give decisions regarding affairs and 
incidents in China� In many cases it is entirely ignorant of what is going on� It has 
been stated on good authority that the Foreign Minister was not aware of the seizure 
of the Spratley [sic] Islands by the Japanese Navy until a few hours before a protest 
was made by the French Ambassador�19
Beyond the breakdown in Japanese civil-military relations, the Japanese 
armed forces, and the IJA in particular, were themselves split between higher-
ranking commanders and their virulently nationalistic field-grade subordinates� 
The latter sought to dictate strategy, and at times even national policy, through 
their actions in the field� Yarnell wrote:
The “younger officer” element in the Army, and to a lesser extent in the Navy, is a 
factor which renders uncertain any policy which may be formulated by officials in 
Tokyo� These officers may in certain cases dictate to their superiors as to policies to 
be followed� Failure to be guided by the young officers may result in assassination� 
Conservative or liberal minded senior officers of the Army and Navy naturally hesi-
tate to assert themselves and may in self defense be forced to assume a chauvinistic 
attitude�20
These twin dynamics had several important implications for Yarnell and 
the Asiatic Fleet� First, State Department channels to the civilian govern-
ment in Tokyo would have little impact and could not be relied on to produce 
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material results in the operational theater� Military-to-military diplomacy among 
in-theater commanders would be considerably more valuable from a practical 
standpoint, thereby stressing the function of the Commander in Chief, Asiatic 
Fleet as naval diplomat� At the same time, however, interacting with and affect-
ing the calculus of leaders on the strategic level would not be enough to deter 
Japanese field-grade subordinates from taking local, aggressive actions against 
American interests� The combination of the lack of political oversight with the 
independence of Japanese officers at low levels of command reduced account-
ability, increased situational uncertainty, and raised the risks associated with U�S� 
deterrent actions, while accentuating the need for effective U�S� deterrence down 
the chain of command to a very localized scale�
Today, although Chinese president Xi Jinping has been at least outwardly suc-
cessful in his campaign to subordinate the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to the 
Chinese Communist Party and his own will, there are in contemporary China 
some disturbing echoes of the conditions that led to interwar Japan’s breakdown 
in civil-military relations and command and control� From an institutional orga-
nization standpoint, there is but one civilian (Xi Jinping) in the Central Military 
Commission atop the PLA chain of command, which is a tenuous arrangement 
for the oversight of an armed force with a long-standing independent streak that 
now is being repressed severely by that lone civilian autocrat�21 Xi and his close 
uniformed partner, Central Military Commission vice-chair General Xu Qiliang, 
have purged over sixty generals as part of the national anticorruption campaign, 
which reports indicate already has contributed to an atmosphere of restiveness 
and instability in the ranks, officer corps, and associated civilian elites�22 On the 
grassroots level, the Chinese Communist Party since 1989 has used a heavy hand 
inculcating popular nationalism to legitimate its rule to the generation that has 
grown up since the Tiananmen Square crackdown and now has begun entering 
the junior levels of the PLA�23
With the present strongman-oriented governmental organization and nation-
alist propaganda campaign likely to persist in the short-to-medium term, the 
combination of weak institutional civilian oversight and popular nationalism in 
the ranks could prove explosive� Recent military veteran protests against poor 
retirement benefits and job prospects similarly bode ill for stability across China’s 
broader military community�24 This combination of factors leaves open the like-
lihood that Xi and Xu’s personal vise grip on China’s armed forces conceivably 
could weaken over the course of their tenure or fail to transfer to their successors, 
all the while agitating those officers desiring more political autonomy or more 
hardheaded nationalism in Chinese policy abroad than the party leadership is 
willing to countenance� Such a situation could lead to an increase in incidents 
involving subordinate PLA commanders taking aggressively risky independent 
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action or to a potentially dangerous PLA institutional move back toward inde-
pendence from civilian political control�25 Given these presently existing circum-
stances in China today, the case study of the military and civil-military politics 
of interwar imperial Japan and the resulting dynamics for foreign forces is worth 
consideration, both now and in coming decades�
JAPAN INVADES CHINA
“A Short, Sharp Campaign”: Then and Now
In July 1937, the IJA embarked on what its general staff envisioned would be a 
limited expeditionary operation to seize five northern Chinese provinces, an op-
erational concept that Yarnell later characterized as “a short, sharp campaign of 
two or three months�”26 Yarnell’s analysis of imperial Japanese anticipation (and, 
ultimately, wishful thinking) of a brief rather than a protracted military action 
would be echoed hauntingly in the Chinese context in 2014 by Captain James 
E� Fanell (USN, Ret�), then deputy chief of staff for intelligence and information 
operations for the U�S� Pacific Fleet� On a panel at the 2014 WEST Conference, 
Fanell publicly stated his assessment that the contemporary PLA “has been given 
a new task: to be able to conduct a short, sharp war to destroy Japanese forces 
in the East China Sea, followed by what can only be expected [to be] a seizure 
of the Senkakus or even the southern Ryukyus, as some of their academics write 
about�”27
In 1937, however, Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek defied mis-
guided Japanese expectations that he would either consent to the seizure of his 
northern provinces or fight Japan’s preferred limited, localized war in the remote 
north�28 Chiang instead surprised the Japanese by laterally escalating the conflict, 
sending his best divisions to attack the small IJN garrison in Shanghai� The Japa-
nese then counterescalated vertically by significantly increasing the resources 
allocated to China and expanding Japanese war aims to include the occupation 
and domination of China in its entirety and the destruction of the Nationalist 
Chinese government�29 After two months of intense urban combat in Shanghai, 
Chiang’s forces were compelled to withdraw, and as winter approached the Japa-
nese moved inland toward the Nationalist Chinese capital at Nanking�
Japan Enters the Gray Zone
The above sequence of events is remembered in hindsight as the initial phase of 
the conflict known as the Second Sino-Japanese War� Yet this modern nomencla-
ture is largely retrospective� When the Japanese invaded China in 1937, neither 
side formally declared war, so the fighting, despite its high intensity and heavy 
casualties, was referred to in Japanese (and later also American) writings as a 
Sino-Japanese “incident,” with the rhetorical implication that this outbreak was 
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just the latest in a long sequence of local clashes between an imperial power and 
a country under varying degrees of foreign occupation and domination�30 This 
seemingly euphemistic terminology had implications for the conflict’s legal status 
and, by extension, for the conduct of the belligerents and the neutral powers� By 
not declaring war, both Japan and China legally denied that one existed, forgo-
ing for themselves any claim to “belligerent rights,” such as the right to declare a 
blockade and enforce it on neutral commerce� The unique landscape of interna-
tional law in China also was unaffected by hostilities, declared or undeclared� All 
past agreements and treaties providing for international freedom of navigation 
on Chinese rivers remained in effect, and indeed stipulated that neutral powers 
could continue to sail Chinese waters even if China was in a declared state of war 
with another foreign power�31
In this legal environment, Japanese attempts to dictate affairs in the interna-
tional settlements or impose restrictions on neutral freedom of navigation in 
Chinese waterways under Japanese military control were neither in accordance 
with law nor legally binding on neutral powers� Therefore, Japanese revisions 
to the status quo vis-à-vis neutral Western powers in China would require ei-
ther the use of force to compel change or the de facto assent of a cooperative 
adversary� Since the greater portion of the Japanese officer corps, apart from 
the most extreme, recognized the at least momentary undesirability of open war 
with the West, Japan’s revisionist gray-zone campaign against Western interests 
manifested itself in a mixture of outwardly innocuous requests, more-menacing 
impositions, and occasional outright intimidations designed to gain this assent�
Japan’s gray-zone assertions against neutral powers started in August 1937, 
around the time its forces began to gain the upper hand in Shanghai� These early 
probing actions took the form of attempts to impose Japanese will in various 
respects on the other powers� For example, they closed the area of the Shanghai 
international settlement normally patrolled by Japanese forces in peacetime to 
nationals of other powers, and then after the fighting had moved on they required 
passes and permissions for residents to reenter to inspect or remove their prop-
erty�32 This action disregarded rights to free movement within the international 
settlement and infringed on the administration of the multinational Shanghai 
Municipal Council�33
More pressingly, the Japanese attempted to restrict international navigational 
rights—which soon became a key sticking point� These restrictions began with a 
proclamation by Vice Admiral Kiyoshi Hasegawa, commander in chief of Japa-
nese naval forces in the Shanghai area, without advance notice to Yarnell or any 
of the other foreign admirals in China, of a “peacetime blockade” of the China 
coast, directed against Chinese shipping, with the caveat that foreign ships “will 
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be liable to boarding by Japanese naval authorities bent on ascertaining their true 
nationality in case of doubt�”34 Hasegawa followed with a request on September 
1, 1937, in response to an inquiry on the matter from Yarnell, for notification 
of movements by American vessels in the proscribed zone�35 Most importantly, 
with the victory in Shanghai and movements west toward Nanking, the Japanese 
gained military control of the Yangtze River and began to assume the right to 
grant or refuse permission to navigate it to other powers—contrary to treaty 
rights�36 This issue would become the key point of gray-zone contention between 
Japan and the West between late 1937 and mid-1939�
The gray-zone confrontation took on new urgency as Japan and China reached 
a battlefield stalemate between 1938 and 1939� After a series of operationally suc-
cessful Japanese offensives nevertheless failed either to bring the Chinese govern-
ment to terms or to impose Japanese control over the restive countryside, the 
Japanese came to regard the Nationalist Chinese bullion reserves, some of which 
were held in the vaults of Western banks within the international settlements and 
concessions, as a potential means of forcing an end to the war through economic 
strangulation� In mid-1939, therefore, the Japanese embarked on their most ag-
gressive gray-zone offensive yet: blockading the British and French concessions 
in Tientsin, introducing landing troops into the foreign concession on Kulangsu 
in Amoy Harbor, and seeking to close China’s last open seaports—Swatow, 
Foochow, Wenchow, and Ningpo—to foreign shipping� According to Yarnell, 
“the taking over of these Concessions, giving them absolute control of [China’s] 
trade and finance, and the capture of the silver stocks now in Concession banks 
would be equivalent to many victories on the battle field�”37
THE YARNELL STRATEGY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
Yarnell’s responses to the spectrum of Japanese impositions show a consistent 
approach of polite but firm resolve, characterized by
• Continuous military-to-military diplomatic contact asserting American 
rights and challenging Japanese infringements on the spot
• Persistent physical U�S� force presence at the point of Japanese gray-zone 
attack
• Development of the Asiatic Fleet’s organizational culture around the prin-
ciples of forward presence, particularly regarding the exercise of independent 
judgment and action by on-scene commanders and subordinates
With these approaches, Yarnell accepted inherent risk attendant to maintaining 
presence in war zones and defending U�S� interests against gray-zone aggressions 
from a malignant, militaristic force unchecked by civilian control�
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Sending U.S. Force Presence toward the Sound of the Guns
Backed by an American national policy of “standing adamantly on all American 
rights of property and person,” Yarnell laid out the foundations of his strategy in 
a statement of policy of the U�S� Asiatic Fleet on September 22, 1937�
The policy of the Commander in Chief during the present emergency is to employ 
U�S� naval forces under his command so as to offer all possible protection and assis-
tance to our nationals in cases where needed� Naval vessels will be stationed in ports 
where American citizens are concentrated and will remain there until it is no longer 
possible or necessary to protect them or until they have been evacuated� This policy  
� � � will continue in full force even after our nationals have been warned to leave 
China and after an opportunity to leave has been given� � � � In giving assistance and 
protection our naval forces may at times be exposed to dangers which will in most 
cases be slight, but in any case these risks must be accepted�38
This approach was assertive and forward leaning, placing U�S� warships in the 
midst of active combat to protect American interests� Indeed, Yarnell deployed 
the bulk of the Asiatic Fleet to Shanghai within hours of the initial outbreak of 
fighting there� Charles Henry Kretz, who served between 1937 and 1938 as first 
lieutenant and gunnery officer of the destroyer USS Bulmer (DD 222), offers a 
vivid account of his ship’s arrival at Shanghai on September 1, 1937� The ship 
entered the mouth of the Yangtze
during the actual landing of the Japanese at Woosung� We went right through the 
Japanese fleet as they were bombarding the shore, with troops along the shore and 
landing craft on the beach� � � � We were right in the middle of the combat, with shells 
flying around all around us� We proceeded on up the Whangpoo River to the Texaco 
compound, where we moored to a pontoon � � � to guard the Texaco compound� We 
were there for months � � � we were right in the midst of most of the fighting� It was all 
around us� � � � The Japanese would come up with their destroyers and cruisers firing 
point-blank into the opposite bank of the river� When they’d get near us, they’d stop 
firing, turn around and salute us, and as soon as they passed, open fire again�39
As the Japanese expanded the conflict beyond Shanghai to different ports, U�S� 
Asiatic Fleet ships would steam toward the sound of the guns, shadowing Japa-
nese operations and taking up station to guard American interests and maintain 
comprehensive deterrence�
Presence operations of this type proved their value in 1939 with the start of the 
Japanese economic strangulation campaign against the Western concessions and 
the remaining open Chinese ports� An illustrative example is the Swatow incident 
in June of that year, when a Japanese expeditionary force took the treaty port of 
Swatow, where approximately forty American and eighty British missionaries 
resided, and demanded the withdrawal of the destroyers USS Pillsbury (DD 227) 
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and HMS Thanet� Yarnell replied by ordering Pillsbury to remain; dispatching a 
second U�S� destroyer to the scene (a move that the British emulated); and com-
municating to his Japanese naval counterpart, Admiral Koshiro Oikawa, “that the 
paramount duty of the United States naval vessels is the protection of American 
citizens and that they will go wherever necessary at any time to carry out that 
mission and will remain in such place as long as American citizens are in need 
of protection or assistance�”40 Faced with this unambiguous commitment, the 
Japanese relented�
Operational Hazards from Both Mistaken and Intentional Attack
The dangers of accidental damage or mistaken attack during these operations 
were considerable—during the first phase of the battle of Shanghai, U�S� warships 
were bombed mistakenly five times by Chinese aircraft and struck by errant an-
tiaircraft shells and shrapnel on numerous occasions� Yarnell’s flagship, USS Au-
gusta (CA 31), was nearly a victim of a Chinese bomb that fell just twenty yards 
wide of the ship, less than half an hour after arriving at the mooring buoy on the 
Whangpoo on the afternoon of August 14, 1937� It suffered one man killed and 
seventeen wounded when an antiaircraft shell exploded on the ship’s well deck 
six days later�41 In October of that year, Yarnell himself was conversing with his 
chief of staff on Augusta’s bridge wing when a piece of shrapnel wounded a radio-
man standing between them� Most infamously, Japanese naval aircraft mistakenly 
bombed and sank the gunboat USS Panay (PR 5) on December 12, while Panay 
was escorting three merchantmen engaged in noncombatant evacuation opera-
tions from Nanking�42
The pursuit of Yarnell’s strategy frequently required Asiatic Fleet ships to place 
themselves in tactically vulnerable positions as they interposed themselves be-
tween a militaristic, unpredictable, aggressive adversary and coveted objectives� 
The risk to American forces was only “slight” so long as the Japanese—which is 
to say, whichever Japanese officer happened to be in tactical command in the 
vicinity—did not choose to start a fight with the United States by simply destroy-
ing the vulnerable American unit before them� While the bombing of Panay 
was a genuine case of misidentification by overzealous Japanese fliers without a 
strike plan, outright deliberate attacks did take place�43 Earlier on December 12, 
an ultranationalist Japanese artillery officer, Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto, chose 
to open fire on a pair of British gunboats operating off Wuhu, and subsequently 
sent soldiers under his command to machine-gun the decks of the sinking Panay 
a few hours later�44
At the time of the attack on Panay, the destroyer Bulmer was riding at anchor 
in Tsingtao between two Japanese cruisers� According to Kretz’s later recollec-
tion, Bulmer’s crew was acutely aware of the ship’s all-but-certain fate should 
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war break out between the United States and Japan at that juncture: “When we 
learned of the sinking of the Panay, we immediately put warheads on our torpe-
does� We kept six torpedoes trained on each of these Japanese cruisers day and 
night� � � � They didn’t have the torpedoes, but they had their guns � � � they were 
trained on us� But if we weren’t going to get out, there were two Japanese cruisers 
that weren’t going to get out either�”45
Deploying Four Stars
Yarnell was particularly effective in his use of the diplomatic stature associated 
with his own four-star rank to assert American rights in the face of Japanese navi-
gational restrictions and blockades� In June 1938, the Japanese delivered letters to 
U�S� ambassador to China Nelson T� Johnson requesting that neutral ships evacu-
ate a 326-mile zone of the Yangtze between Wuhu and Hankow and provide no-
tification of future movements� In addition, in light of past difficulties regarding 
identification of neutral vessels from the air, the letters expressed that Japanese 
air commanders “earnestly hope[d] � � � that the Powers concerned would find out 
a new method to make their vessels more distinguishable, for example, such as 
painting the greater part of the vessels SCARLET [emphasis original] or in other 
colours�”46 Yarnell flatly refused to repaint or restrict the movements of U�S� war-
ships on the Yangtze and reiterated that Japanese forces must hold themselves 
accountable for damage to American lives and property�
Later that month, Yarnell cruised aboard the Asiatic Fleet’s armed yacht and 
relief flagship USS Isabel (PY 10) from Shanghai without Japanese naval escort to 
Nanking, downriver of the purported “danger zone” but nevertheless penetrat-
ing an area that the Japanese previously had pronounced impassable to foreign 
shipping�47 Yarnell then repeated the maneuver with U�S� consul Clarence Gauss 
aboard in January 1939, proceeding as far as Wuhu and proclaiming to report-
ers that, in light of the area’s lack of fighting, clearance of previous navigational 
barriers, and presence of many Japanese transport ships on the river, he saw no 
reason why the Yangtze should not be open to international shipping�48 Since the 
Japanese could not well impede the passage of an American four-star admiral on 
an inspection tour without causing a serious incident, Yarnell used himself as a 
powerful diplomatic chess piece to ensure the success of what today would be 
labeled “freedom of navigation operations” that asserted American navigational 
rights on the Yangtze while undermining the public Japanese position that the 
river was not physically safe�
Fostering a Mission Command Culture
Yarnell also harnessed and nurtured his force’s distinctive organizational culture, 
which encouraged independent action and judgment on the part of relatively 
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junior officers in high-stakes political-military-diplomatic situations� This sen-
sibility was inculcated well down the chain of command, as was the case with 
Kretz’s ship, USS Bulmer, at Amoy in July 1938� The Japanese had conducted 
an amphibious landing on Amoy Island in early May of that year, leading to a 
significant exodus of civilians from Amoy into the international settlement on 
the adjacent island of Kulangsu� Japanese troops occupied Amoy Island, while 
the Chinese held the shore of the mainland� Yarnell sent Bulmer to relieve the 
destroyer Edsall (DD 219) at Amoy in early July with broad, mission-type orders, 
which Bulmer’s commanding officer, Walter Ansel, later recounted were simply 
“‘to protect American interests’ � � � that’s all I could get out of him�”49 Ansel de-
scribed his approach to this tasking with a frank, clear-eyed assessment of the 
potential range of action open to on-scene commanders with such instructions 
and of the implications of a captain’s performance on his career prospects: “If 
you protected them [American interests] and met emergencies which couldn’t be 
anticipated and you did something that was a little extreme or maybe impulsive 
and succeeded, you were a duke� But if it turned out sour and you caused trouble, 
if the problem intensified, why, of course, you � � � weren’t doing very well and you 
could be yanked out�”50
The anchorage for U�S� station ships in Amoy was chosen to ensure line of 
sight to the two major American interests in the vicinity: the U�S� consulate fac-
ing Amoy on Kulangsu and a Standard Oil installation on the Chinese mainland 
on the far side of Kulangsu from Amoy (see figures 1 and 2)�51 With Bulmer 
anchored in this key position, Japanese artillery began to fire directly over the 
American ship to hit purported Chinese positions on the mainland, and as Kretz 
later explained, “periodically, they’d land a shell as close to us as they possibly 
could�”52 On the third day, Ansel resolved as follows:
It was obvious to me that they were shooting to get me out of that anchorage, just to 
show me they could do it� So I got in my gig, with my dress clothes on, my sword, and 
a pennant flying and landed on the Japanese shore� � � � There was a Japanese naval 
aide � � � and they [the aide and an interpreter] carried me up to the boss Admiral� I 
told him that shells were flying every day right over my ship� � � � The admiral asked 
right away, is it interfering with any of your instruments? I said, ‘No, we have no in-
struments that shelling could hurt� However, if one of your gunners makes a mistake 
and the shell doesn’t go over us, I would have to reply with everything that the United 
States ship Bulmer has� � � �” And he said, ‘I have great confidence that we will never 
make a mistake like that�’ I had to reply that I had great confidence in the capabilities 
of the United States ship Bulmer to defend herself, and we looked at each other and 
laughed� They didn’t fire over us again�53
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Ansel’s narrative is not, however, the whole story� While the captain and the execu-
tive officer were meeting with the Japanese, Kretz, as first lieutenant, had com-
mand of the ship� Kretz recounts that, during this period while the senior officers 
were engaged in their diplomatic tête-à-tête ashore, “the Japanese let one go right 
on our bow�”54 Accordingly, Kretz demonstrated his own Asiatic Fleet initiative 
and steely nerve: “I went to general quarters and aimed our 5-inch guns on this 
gun emplacement, which I could see not more than 500 yards from us� And they 
stopped firing on us�” Reminiscing years later, Kretz aptly described the deterrence 
dynamics at work both in this specific situation and more broadly in the Japanese 
gray-zone campaign with a succinct summation: “they were playing chicken�”55
JAPAN EXITS THE GRAY ZONE
Despite its successes on the operational level at checking and deterring Japanese 
gray-zone aggression against American interests in China, the small Asiatic Fleet 
FIGURE 1
ENVIRONS OF AMOY
This figure shows detail of environs of Amoy. The Standard Oil plant is at the terminus of the railway (black line) marked Seng-su, to the west of Kulangsu. 
Sources: An Official Guide to Eastern Asia, vol. 4, China (Tokyo: Imperial Japanese Government Railways, 1915), available at www.lib.utexas.edu/; P. W. 
Pitcher, In and about Amoy (Shanghai: Methodist Publishing, 1910), pp. 215, 266, e-book.
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nevertheless was subject to the larger political and strategic forces that were 
impelling the United States and Japan toward a direct confrontation� It was not 
long after Yarnell handed off command of the Asiatic Fleet to his Naval Academy 
classmate Admiral Thomas C� Hart, USN, in July 1939 that Japan’s ally Germany 
opened hostilities in Europe with its invasion of Poland, deepening the interna-
tional crisis� With the sudden collapse of France in midsummer 1940, one of the 
major European powers in China and Southeast Asia effectively became neutral-
ized� Hart and his fleet worked successfully to ensure that the Japanese would not 
use that occasion as an opening to move on French and other Western interests in 
China� But Hart’s fleet was not in a position to stop the Japanese from seizing the 
American consulate marked, facing Amoy across Amoy Harbor. Approximate distance from Kulangsu to Amoy is one-half mile. Standard Oil plant on 
mainland at Seng-su is one mile to the west of Kulangsu (not on map). U.S. destroyers seeking to maintain line of sight to both the consulate and Standard 
Oil therefore had to moor to the north of Kulangsu, close to Amoy Island; as Kretz indicates, Bulmer was five hundred yards from the offending Japanese 
artillery position at the time of the shelling incident in July 1938. 
Source: U.S. Army Map Service, 1945, available at www.lib.utexas.edu/.
FIGURE 2
HSIA-MEN (AMOY), 1945, DETAIL OF KULANGSU
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northern part of France’s colony in Indochina, the first step on Japan’s southward 
advance toward Malaya and Singapore�
With tensions on the rise between the United States and Japan, Hart reached 
the difficult conclusion that the strategic competition with Japan soon would 
change the Asiatic Fleet’s mission from contesting subtle yet aggressive Japanese 
moves to fighting Japan in overt hostilities� He later described his reasoning: “By 
mid-October, 1940, I became convinced that the place for me was with the Fleet, 
and for the Fleet in the Philippines, that our main job was to get ready for war; 
that being on the China Coast protecting American interests and all that was not 
reduced in importance, but it was no longer the main issue; that as such it must 
be dropped; that I myself should get south with the Fleet and get ready for the 
war which I felt more and more every day was coming�”56
With strategic-level conditions darkening the clouds over the Pacific, Hart 
discontinued his predecessor’s strategy for countering Japan’s creeping aggres-
sion against U�S� interests and withdrew his force to Philippine waters to begin 
working up for combat�
Hart was proved prescient a little over a year later in December 1941, when the 
Asiatic Fleet was one of the few Allied formations in the Pacific to weather the 
initial wave of Japanese attacks unsurprised and relatively unscathed�57 However, 
the Asiatic Fleet subsequently would be lost after the inexperienced and incom-
petent Dutch vice admiral Conrad Helfrich politically engineered Hart’s removal 
from command in February 1942 and threw the combined Allied naval forces in 
Southeast Asia into the poorly conceived and badly planned battle of the Java Sea� 
Helfrich gave no regard for the logistical and command-and-control arrange-
ments needed for an ill-equipped, multinational, multilingual fleet to achieve 
victory against a homogeneous, well-coordinated foe with numerous advantages 
over the Allied striking force, including superior scouting and night-fighting 
capabilities, powerful (and reliably functional) ship-launched torpedoes, and 
near-complete control of the air�58 The Java Sea action and those that followed 
led to the vast majority of the U�S� naval losses in the Philippines and Dutch East 
Indies campaigns, totaling twenty-two ships sunk, 1,826 men killed or missing, 
and 518 sailors captured by the Japanese�59
There are several takeaways from this study of Japanese gray-zone aggression 
against the West and the U�S� Asiatic Fleet’s actions to deter it� The situation 
among the imperial powers in China in the 1930s is, in several important ways, 
similar to contemporary conditions� Japan’s gray-zone efforts against the other 
treaty powers sought to subvert a well-codified and unambiguous international 
law environment inside China that bears a close resemblance to key elements of 
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the current worldwide international legal architecture, particularly with respect 
to the law of the sea�
Many of Japan’s maneuvers in the 1930s should be recognizable to contem-
porary China observers� China today demands prior notification of transit and 
insists on a right to grant explicit permission to foreign warships and aircraft 
conducting innocent operations in Chinese territorial waters and exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs)�60 China has made assertive increases in maritime law-
enforcement and naval patrols around disputed maritime features and—similarly 
to the Japanese blockade at Tientsin—physically interposed China Coast Guard 
and PLA Navy assets to harass U�S� and allied ships and aircraft during routine 
operations in EEZs and international waters�61 Chinese forces even attempted a 
strategic-level version of the 1938 Bulmer shelling affair at Amoy with their in-
famous (and politically counterproductive) firing of ballistic-missile salvos into 
the approaches of major Taiwanese ports, endeavoring to disrupt commercial 
shipping traffic and influence an upcoming Taiwanese election during the third 
Taiwan Strait crisis, in 1996�
Admiral Yarnell’s policy—that “United States naval vessels � � � will go wherever 
necessary at any time � � � and will remain in such place as long as American citizens 
are in need of protection or assistance”—can be characterized as the imperial era’s 
equivalent to the modern American mantra that “the United States will fly, sail, 
and operate wherever international law allows�”62 Yarnell’s strategy for gray-zone 
deterrence—incorporating continuous military-to-military communication, 
persistent physical forward presence, and the inculcation of a culture of indepen-
dent judgment and mission command down to junior levels of responsibility— 
allowed the Asiatic Fleet to “punch above its weight” by leveraging all its assets, 
from its commander’s four-star rank to the adaptive thinking and independence 
of its junior officers on the spot� Although political and strategic dynamics be-
yond the control of forward-deployed naval forces would lead the United States 
and Japan into an open conflagration in late 1941, the Asiatic Fleet’s counter-
gray-zone campaign against the Japanese in China between 1937 and 1940 offers 
a valuable case study with critical insights for those seeking to craft strategies to 
deter and defeat gray-zone aggression in the contemporary western Pacific�
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